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 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Eight months after losing the 2008 election, ex-Vice Presidential Candidate Sarah Palin 
quit her job as Alaskan governor. While this might signify her total removal from politics, the 
months following her withdrawal Palin defied this notion thrusting herself onto the national 
scene, publishing her memoir Going Rogue and beginning a nation-wide (self) promotional tour. 
Given her heightened visibility, the media has (not surprisingly) scrutinized Palin’s every move 
concluding that she is a populist. The New Yorker ranks Palin’s “insistent ordinariness” among 
other famed American populists such as William Jennings Bryan who “have always been 
divisive and polarizing. 1 Their [populists] job is not to win national elections but to carry the 
torch and inspire the faithful.”2 On the other hand, Newsweek characterizes her among a trend of 
“faux populists [that] feast on emotions—anxiety, anger, resentment—that intensify in hard 
times. . . more accurately described as plain old reactionaries.”3 The Daily Beast calls Palin’s 
appeal to the ‘common American people’ less than genuine as she tours the country in her 
private jet.4 The media cannot quite figure out Palin or populism; is she really a populist? And if 
so, what does that mean for American politics?  
Populism has characterized various political figures throughout time and throughout the 
world. In the late 1800’s The People’s Party – an American populist party – emerged because of 
agrarian unrest. Also in the 19th Century, Russia saw populism manifest as a reaction to 
                                                 
1
 Sam Tanenhaus, “North Star: Populism, Politics and the power of Sarah Palin,” The New 
Yorker, December 7, 2009. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Jonathan Alter. “Enter the Foxulists: The Faux Populism of Palin, Dobbs, and Beck,” 
Newsweek, December 7, 2009. 
4
 "Palin's Bus Hoax," The Daily Beast, entry posted November 29, 2009, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-11-29/palins-bus-hoax/ (accessed April 6, 
2010). 
 4 
Alexander IIs emancipation of the serfs.5 Latin America has experienced waves of populism 
beginning with Argentina’s Juan Perón, who created a lasting populist movement appealing to 
Argentina’s working class. Recently, Latin America has experienced another populist surge via 
leaders such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Argentina’s Kirchner 
administration. The term ‘populist’ has even infiltrated contemporary American politics with the 
emergence of Sarah Palin. Though all of these leaders and movements, along with others, fall 
under the populist umbrella, academic literature has trouble reaching a consensus on populism’s 
definition.  
To understand populism and its leaders, the term “populist” deserves clearer elucidation. 
When approaching literature on populism, most theories begin describing the difficulty that 
theorists have had defining the concept. Francisco Panizza opens his book with this disclaimer: 
“it has become almost a cliché to start writing on populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about 
the concept and casting doubts about its usefulness for political analysis.” 6 Given that the term 
populism has been ascribed to many leaders and movements, I do not doubt the utility in 
understanding the concept. Many theories present a laundry list of criteria, while others narrow 
the scope to geographic locations or time periods.7 I agree that these theories do little to 
theoretically clarify populism, but that does not mean other theories have not identified a 
theoretical understanding of populism useful for understanding the phenomenon. I hope to 
present both an accurate overview of various academic attempts to define populism along with 
my own conceptions of the phenomenon. 
                                                 
5
 J.F Conway “Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of 
Canada's Third Parties,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (1978), 113. 
6
 Francisco Panizza, introduction to Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, by Francisco 
Panizza (London: Verso, 2005),1. 
7
 In Francisco Panizza’s Introduction he outlines various definitions that limit populism to 
geography or time, 2-17.  
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Instead of limiting populism to a specific ideology or time period, my approach analyzes 
populism as a movement that emerges under certain political conditions. Though certain populist 
movements share similar economic or political ideologies, what connects all populist 
governments is not these ideologies, but rather the way in which populism emerges. When a 
current government fails to address the needs of a large enough constituency it creates conditions 
ripe for populism. In other words, it is a movement, a reaction to a deficient political system. 
‘The people’ feel neglected in some way by their government; the populist leader appeals to this, 
suggesting s/he can better represent their political desires. Using certain tactics, which I will later 
outline, these leaders present themselves as separate from the current establishment to win ‘the 
people’ over.   
After more clearly defining the parameters of populism, I look at its manifestations 
through contemporary movements. Specifically I look to Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chávez and former Alaskan governor Sarah Palin to demonstrate how they exemplify 
populism. Using these leaders I show how they embody all features of populist governance. 
These leaders operate in different contexts yet they all make similar political moves as they 
attempt to gain power. Both Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez fit into this framework and have 
both used populist tactics for political success. On the other hand, Palin exemplifies certain 
aspects of the populist leader, but has not yet demonstrated that she has wooed the American 
people. Yet, Palin still provides a useful example of the ways populist leaders conceptualize and 
relate to their people and perhaps in the future Palin will attain the political success of her peers; 
however, also I go on to argue that Palin – operating in a different political context than her 
contemporaries – will not have the same successes as other contemporary populists. 
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Given both populism and democracy’s focus on representation and ‘the people’, some 
theorists argue for populism’s place as a democratic mode of governance. After discussing the 
features of populism, I address this question of whether populism is a mode of democracy. My 
analysis discusses the way populism approaches representation, arguing that populism reflects a 
less democratic type of representation than liberal democracy. However, using Margaret 
Canovan’s theory of populism as a shadow of democracy demonstrates how populism does fit 
within liberal democracy. Canovan argues that populism is an inherent part of democracy that 
manifests when democracy relies too heavily on institutions and not enough of the ideal of ‘the 
people’. As I explain, I largely agree with Canovan’s reading of populism as a reaction to the 
inherent elitism within liberal democracy, and therefore an inherent aspect of democracy. I also 
agree with her ominous terminology ‘shadow’ that implies populism is a negative reaction to 
liberal democracy’s shortcomings in that the way it ‘corrects’ presents a worse democratic mode 
of governance than even elitist liberal democracy.  
As discussed earlier, the idea that populist leaders represent the true will of ‘the people’ 
gives populism some claim to democratic legitimacy. Looking closer at the ways these leaders 
believe they represent their people lends insight into the type of democracy populists perpetuate. 
Populists often refer to ‘the people’, justifying their rule using the rhetoric of ‘the people’. Via 
speeches, interviews and some secondary sources, I specifically look at how these leaders 
reference ‘the people’, in what contexts and how they later define ‘the people’. This 
understanding of the ways populist leaders define their people demonstrates how these leaders 
relate to their constituencies and whom they try to represent when making political decisions and 
reforms, once elected. Additionally, looking at the way populist leaders conceive of their people, 
I argue that the populist ‘people’ differs from an American or liberal democratic understanding 
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of this term. Though there are many democratic conceptions of ‘the people’, I choose to focus on 
‘the people’ as the electorate. Comparing the electorate to the way Morales, Chávez and Palin 
conceive of ‘the people’ demonstrates a key difference between populism and liberal democracy.  
After making these general comparisons, I expand my findings to Sarah Palin and 
populism in the United States. Sarah Palin’s populism cannot succeed in America’s liberal 
democracy. The way populist leaders use the rhetoric of ‘the people’ to gain power demonstrates 
the power of such rhetoric in their given government type, country and political climate. As 
discussed above, populist leaders refer to a homogenized ‘people’ that have a specific legislative 
need that is not being met. The United States political system does not operate under the same 
terms. I suggest that the United States adheres to a liberal democratic notion of ‘the people’ that 
fundamentally differs from the populist notion. Therefore, successful American leaders must also 
abide by this notion. Though Sarah Palin does not fall into the “successful” leader category (yet), 
her actions and rhetoric qualify her as a populist.  If she tries to appeal to a homogenized 
segment to gain political popularity, she will fail. Unlike Bolivia, a politically underserved 
homogenized majority does not exist in America – in other words our idea of ‘the people’ 
appreciates including diverse people from different cultural or economic backgrounds. At least 
ideally, Americans relate to each other because each has the power to vote. By contrast populists 
believe their constituencies relate on cultural or economic lines. Therefore, I hypothesize that for 
Palin to attain electoral/governmental success in the United States she would have to conform to 
the American notion of ‘the people’ as a heterogeneous electorate.  
This paper will enhance democratic theory not only showing how populist rulers define 
this “democratic” term, but also how it fits in with democratic theorist’s definitions. My 
comparisons will demonstrate a more concrete understanding of the populist leaders appeal to 
 8 
‘the people’, and therefore a relationship between populism and democracy. Not only does my 
research have theoretical importance, but it also has relevance for today’s world. Due to the 
success of recent populist movements, studying this movement/regime type adds greater 
understanding to these emergent governments. Populist governments are sometimes 
characterized as totalitarian dictatorships and are therefore perceived as a threat to liberal 
democracy. If populism presents such danger, a deeper understanding will help combat this 
threat. Or perhaps, populism does not present any sort of threat, but rather demonstrates a 
different understanding of democracy compatible with liberal democracy. Either way 
understanding populism is useful for contemporary politics. Even if populism presents a threat to 
liberal democracy, its call for increased participation of the politically disenfranchised deserves 
respect in that is points to the very real elitism that exists in liberal democracies. Whether 
genuine or not, populism calls for increased access and agency for the powerless. Though 
populism may not present the ideal solution to liberal democracy’s faults, it illuminates these 
problems and offers an alternative approach.    
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II. DEFINING POPULISM 
 
Before analyzing modern populist leaders, defining populism is useful for understanding 
these leaders and this phenomenon. Instead of outlining certain characteristics that many populist 
governments share, I present a theory of populism as a movement that emerges under certain 
political conditions. What defines populism is not a specific ideology, but rather the way in 
which populist leaders attain power and stay in power. When the relationship between a 
government (the leaders and institutions) no longer satisfies a large constituency of the 
population, this creates a space for a populist leader to appeal to this underserved community. 
The populist leader uses certain tactics – mostly rhetorical – to demonstrate to the constituency 
the shortcomings of the current administration and how s/he can better appeal to this group. If 
the leader relates to the group, convincing ‘the people’ that s/he better represents its needs, s/he 
will succeed. After election, populist leaders attempt to maintain the relationship they have 
cultivated, instituting reforms that benefit the constituency – or at least give ‘the people’ more 
political agency. This next section will discuss the following features that all populist movements 
share, which make it an identifiable mode of governance. Specifically, that they can all be 
characterized as movements, rather than ideologies and that these movements emerge because of 
a deficient political system that allows a populist leader to emerge. Though conditions may exist 
in which populist can flourish, without a leader to mobilize ‘the people’, the movement will not 
manifest. This movement needs a leader who both separates himself/herself from the current 
administrations and also cultivates a special relationship between himself/herself and ‘the 
people’ thus creating an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. Finally, once elected the leader institutes 
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reforms that solidify his/her relationship with the people, giving them more autonomy via 
increased political participation. 
Daniel Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell define populism as “an ideology which pits a 
virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together 
depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, 
prosperity, identity and voice”8 For them, populism is an “ideology” and therefore exists as a set 
of beliefs. I disagree with this term “ideology.” Ideology suggests a set of ideals, or a manner of 
thinking. Rather than an ideology, populism represents a style of politics. An ideology suggests 
that all populist movements base their movements upon the same tenets; however, looking at 
various populist movements we that this is not the case. What connects all populist movements – 
unlike an ideology like Liberalism, or Marxism – is the way the leaders relate to the ‘people’, 
come to power and operate. Populism emerges out of a deficient political system that fails to 
serve a large homogenous set of the population, and is therefore more spontaneous and organic 
than an ideology. For example, the failure of the Argentine government to address the needs of 
the new industrial class facilitated Juan Perón’s populist movement. The government did not 
address the needs of this new working class by limiting union efforts to raise wages and 
prohibiting the existence of the Confederación General de Trabajo del Republica Argentina – a 
major labor union.9 Because of the inability of the government to address this large 
constituency’s need a space opened for Perón to mobilize these people, and create his populist 
movement. Therefore, it emerges out of necessity – because they system has reached a point that 
                                                 
8
 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, "The Sceptre and the Spectre," introduction to 
Twenty-First Century Populism, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),3. 
9
 Jeremy Adelman, “Reflections on Argentine Labour and the Rise of Chávez.”Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, 11 (3 Sep., 1992): 247. 
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allows a populist leader to emerge and create or organize ‘‘the people’’. All other populist 
movements are cultivated under similar conditions.  
Unlike an ideology like Marxism or liberalism, specific ideals or tenets cannot be applied 
to all populist governments. Rather, each regime conforms to the perceived needs of its ‘people’. 
Specifically, populism conforms to the platform of its leader. Yves Mény and Yves Surel put it 
well, calling populism an “empty shell which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is 
poured into it.”10 Populism conforms to the platform of its leader. Therefore, without the ability 
to pinpoint specific policies or ideals unique to all populist regimes, defining populism is more 
difficult than other government types. Paul Taggart put it aptly when he said: “populism has an 
essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on the hue of the environment it occurs 
in.”11 Though theorists define it as an ideology, populism is best described as a style of 
governance that emerges in certain conditions. I think understanding populism not as an 
ideology, but rather as a style of politics is essential for reaching an accurate definition. Once 
certain political or economic platforms are uniformly assigned to all populist governments, these 
theories of populism lose resilience. Understanding each populist movement apart from its 
specific beliefs provides a much clearer, more accurate and lasting understanding of the 
phenomenon.  
Many theorists have related populism to a specific economic climate, theorizing that it 
emerges during periods of industrialization or modernization. For example, Germani sees 
populism as a “deviation in the standard path from traditional to modern society”12 Lasch sees it 
                                                 
10
 Yves Mény and Yves Surel, "The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism," in Democracies and 
the Populist Challenge, by Yves Mény and Yves Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 6.  
11
 Paul Taggart, introduction to Populism, (Philadelphia: Open University Press), 4. 
12
 Taggart, Populism, 15. 
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as a “response to the crisis of modernity”.13 Shils believes that populism represents “the tension 
between metropolis and province”.14 By placing this type of restriction on populist governments, 
certain leaders that I would categorize as populist do not fit the mold. Populist governments have 
flourished during periods of modernization, but it is not a necessary component for a government 
to be considered populist. In short, industrialization came and went; populism persists. For 
example, the populist movements in Western European countries as well as Sarah Palin’s foray 
demonstrate that developed countries also produce this regime type. We have seen the 
institutionalization of populist regimes in Western Europe – an economically developed area of 
the world – during the twenty-first century, proving that populism is not limited to moments of 
modernization. Looking to Italy, Berlusconi’s government falls under the populist umbrella. Like 
other populist leaders he presents himself as part of ‘the people’ and not of the government 
“Berlusconi acts as if complicit with his audience, with the aim of appearing as the only sincere 
and worthy interpreter of what the man in the street thinks.”15 In Italy the ‘man in the street’ does 
not equate to the rural farmers unable to adapt to the quickly modernizing society, but rather the 
“middle class which he has never severed ties with” and “the most disadvantaged of the common 
people whom the parties and unions of the left have abandoned”16 The populist people can take 
on many forms. Economic constraints limit the populist people to ‘the poor’, which does not 
include these other groups.  
Because rapid modernization causes rapid change, especially for certain established 
classes, some think populism acts as a backlash to modernization and a push for a return to 
                                                 
13
 Benjamin Arditi, “Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics,” in Populism and 
the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (New York: Verso 2005), 72. 
14
 Panizza, Populism and the Mirror, 4. 
15
 Marco Tarchi, “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms,” in Twenty First Century Populism, ed. 
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 94. 
16
 Tarchi, “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms,” 95. 
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traditional lifestyle. I think that periods of modernization created a climate in which populism 
had the chance to flourish, but it is not a necessary factor. For example, as the U.S. moved away 
from an agrarian economy, the farmers felt displaced and underserved by the government, which 
focused on railroad and merchant interests.17 Any time a large homogenous group – like farmers 
– can ban together, believing that their government has failed them, a populist regime can form. 
Therefore, in times of modernization, especially industrialization, large segments of the 
population felt neglected thus fostering the perfect environment for the populist leader to create a 
movement. However, modernization is not the only climate in which large homogonous 
populations can feel underserved thus creating a populist movement. Often, populist movements 
do emerge during times of economic unrest because groups blame their economic plight on the 
government’s failures. For example, the economic oil crisis in Venezuela helped Chávez’s 
populist platform because it created a space for his figure to emerge. The poorest people felt the 
economic failures most and blamed the wealthy political elites, who relied on oil revenues, for 
their situation.18 This distance allowed Chávez to emerge, organize a homogenized poor 
population, and run his anti-establishment platform.  
Demonstrating how these economic ideologies fail to translate to all populist movements 
illustrates the danger in designating populism as an ideology. No specific economic or political 
ideology characterizes all populist governments, but rather, conditions that create a dissatisfied 
homogenous group suffice. More important than what types of climates cause a populist leader 
to emerge is the fact that a large underserved group exists. For populist movements to rise, a 
leader must have access to significant homogonizable group because a key component to 
                                                 
17
 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History, Volume Two Second Edition, (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
18
 Ronald Sylvia, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” Third World 
Quarterly, 24, no. 1 (February 2003): 65. 
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populism is the existence of a populist ‘people’. Or rather, the special relationship the populist 
leader creates between himself/herself and his/her designated people is essential to the 
movement. Rickard Lalander presents perhaps the most basic understanding of this relationship: 
“el populismo se caracteriza por la interacción directa entre el pueblo y la elite (o el pueblo y el 
líder).” [Populism is characterized by the direct interaction between the ‘pueblo’ (people) and the 
elite (or ‘‘the people’’ and the leader)].19 For Lalander, the key aspect to populism lies in the 
direct relationship between ‘the people’ and leader. In populist movements, leaders define ‘the 
people’ and form a distinct relationship with said ‘people’. Specifically, they use rhetoric to 
present themselves as of ‘the people’ and therefore better able to represent ‘the people’. By 
including themselves as a part of ‘the people’, ‘the people’ feel more connected to this leader 
than the current “elite” establishment. Demonstrating the underrepresentation of this mass (their 
people), they then claim to represent the mass in a more legitimate, meaningful and some might 
say democratic way. Populist leaders cultivate this direct leadership first by using rhetoric to 
relate to their people. They try to legitimate their position, luring their people using their 
language and including themselves as a part of ‘the people’. After winning over their 
constituency they then solidify a more direct relationship by removing barriers to political 
participation instituting more direct forms of participation like referenda.20 
By defining their people, the leaders create ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies in their 
societies. The more economic focused philosophies claim populism always forms a ‘rural’ versus 
‘urban’ or a ‘rich’ versus ‘poor’ distinction. This understanding limits populism to too narrow a 
                                                 
19
 Rickard Lalander, “Algunas reflexiones sobre populismo, descentralización y Chavismo,” Red 
de Revistas Científicas de América Latina, y el Caribe, España y Portugal 48 (Spring 2004): 9. 
20
 Referenda are not a necessary feature of all populist governments; however, populist leaders 
must institute reforms that create a more direct democratic process. Often these leaders use 
referenda because they allow ‘the people’ more political participation and agency. 
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lens.  Yes, certain populist movements, like the United States People’s Party of the 19th Century, 
did divide society into a rural (farmers) and urban (merchants, railroad and industrial interests), 
but not all populist movements rely on this divide. However, the ‘people’ and its ‘other’ do not 
always have to reflect ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ differences, but can reflect other distinctions. For 
example, in Argentina Populism stressed the role of the urban worker; in Bolivia Morales 
focuses on the indigenous people. These other definitions confine Populism to a specific time 
period in which societies industrialize and develop. As demonstrated by current populist 
movements, a society’s stage of development does not determine if a populist movement will 
emerge. Populist governments are more about a rejection of the current administration’s inability 
to address ‘the people’s’ needs and wants – a reaction to misrepresentation and under-
representation – rather than a reaction to modernization. Therefore, the dichotomization depends 
on the circumstances in which the populist movement emerges and cannot be limited to ‘rich’ 
versus ‘poor’. 
The way in which the leader operates is essential to populism, therefore, without the 
leader populism could not exist. Ernesto Laclau presents a similar perspective suggesting 
populism manifests because of an ideology of the elite “[populism] occurs when one fraction of 
the dominant class seeks to establish hegemony but is unable to do so and so makes a direct 
appeal to the masses.”21 Unlike other definitions, Laclau believes that elites cause populist 
movements to develop. I agree with Laclau that populism emerges from the rhetoric of an elite. 
Unlike Laclau I do not think that this occurs because a dominant class cannot establish 
hegemony without the masses. The elite – or rather, the leader – understands the inability of the 
current administration to appeal to ‘the people’ and then organizes ‘the people’ by presenting 
                                                 
21
 Taggart, Populism, 17. 
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himself/herself as an alternative to the establishment.22 Also, I believe unrest already exists 
within the masses, but without elite support a populist movement could not and would not 
emerge. I think that a leader who either is of ‘the people’ or claims to be of ‘the people’ uses 
rhetoric to legitimize his/her position and organize the masses.  
Understanding the relationship between the leader and his/her people is key to defining 
populism.  All populist leaders have very similar ways of cultivating this relationship. 
Specifically, they must present themselves to their people in such a way that garners their trust. 
One adjective that has often been used to describe populist leaders is “charismatic” or 
“personalistic” I agree that a populist leader must have charisma that resonates with his/her 
people, or else s/he could not maintain his/her position or his/her relationship with the masses.23  
The masses relate not to a particular party or ideology, but with what the leader represents and 
the way in which s/he conveys his platform. For example, during Argentina’s Juan Perón 
administration, ‘the people’ related to Perón so much so that his movement received the moniker 
“El Chávezismo”. Chávez defined a political movement, rather than the other way around. When 
people discuss the current Venezuelan political situation, they reference Chávez – not his party 
and not his movement (the Bolivian Revolution) – but the leader himself. This demonstrates that 
populist movements do not rely on ideologies, but rather the leaders that create the movement. 
Therefore, without a memorable or engaging personality, these leaders would lose their 
                                                 
22
 I use the term ‘establishment’ in reference to the parties and people who hold political power. 
The populist leader refers to this group as a cohesive homogenous group and tries to oppose their 
power by creating a populist movement. Though they may not necessarily be a homogenous 
group that acts in unison, I choose to refer to them as such because this is how populist leaders 
operate.  
23
 Kenneth Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin American: The 
Peruvian Case”, World Politics 48 (October 1995): 84. 
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connection to ‘the people’. Since populism relies on this relationship, without this specific 
personality type populism would fail.  
The special relationship between the leader and the led also relies on the way in which 
the leader came to power. The leader must appear as a “political-outsider” – in the sense that 
they do not belong to institutionalized parties. Though Roberts claims the leader must bypass 
well-established institutions to gain power, as long as the leader presents himself/herself as 
outside of the institutionalized parties at the time, s/he can maintain the image he needs.24 
Certain populist leaders – Huge Chávez, Evo Morales – have come to power using elections, 
which is an institutionalized form of representation. Though these leaders worked within the 
existing political system, utilizing the election process to gain power, they still present 
themselves as separate from the ruling administration.  
More importantly than how the leader comes to power, is the way s/he is perceived in 
relation to the establishment. The masses have a resentful relationship with the established 
masses, therefore the leader must challenge this established political and economic elite. The 
leader must do this because ‘the people’ feel wronged, betrayed or unrepresented by this elite. 
Since ‘the people’ lost trust in the current administration, they rely on a leader who they perceive 
as separate from the corrupt government. Without this relationship between elites and masses, 
the leader would not succeed in mobilizing his populist movement. Some believe the masses 
must oppose a long-established differentiated ruling class. Earlier populist movements opposed 
long established ruling classes; however, it is not necessary that the leader oppose a very 
established regime.25 As long as the populist leader comes from outside the current political 
                                                 
24
 Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism”, World Politics, 84.  
25
 Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American 
Security Policies (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), 100-101. 
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establishment, s/he can present himself/herself legitimately to his people. For example, consider 
Argentina’s Carlos Menem who came to power after the unpopular Raul Alfonsín. As the first 
democratically elected president of Argentina after the military regime, Alfonsín did not come 
from a long-established party system. However, Menem still appeared as a political outsider in 
the way he presented his political platform to ‘the people’. As long as the leader presents 
himself/herself to the electorate as distinct from the current dominant political establishment, 
s/he maintains his special relationship with ‘the people’ and is considered a populist leader. Also, 
I think this underestimates the importance of the leader’s role. Without the leader to define and 
organize ‘the people’, the populist movement could not succeed.  
Not only do all populist leaders have certain commonalities, but also the populist ‘people’ 
has specific shared characteristics. The leader presents himself/herself in the specific ways 
outlined above in order to win over his/her ‘people’. I have referred to the populist people as an 
“underserved homogenous group”. Though the populist leader essentially defines his/her people, 
using rhetoric and the above outlined methods (presenting himself as a political outsider, as one 
of ‘the people’), ‘the people’ has to relate to one another on some level too, or else the leader 
would not succeed. I suggest that this group must be homogonous because the leader refers to 
his/her people as a homogenous entity, and if the leader hopes to succeed electorally, ‘the 
people’ has to give into his/her rhetoric. For example, Morales discusses his constituency as the 
indigenous population. Using this term homogenizes his/her constituency. Since, the Bolivian 
indigenous people can relate to each other on this cultural level and also to the leader, Morales 
has succeeded. The leader demonstrates to this homogenous group that the current establishment 
has not served the group’s needs as a whole. If the group were not homogenous, these methods 
would be less effective. Since the leader presents himself/herself as both a political outsider and 
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as a part of said ‘people’, ‘the people’ trust the leader. Since the leader relies on the rhetoric of 
the ‘people’, if his/her people are not homogenous then the methods he uses to gain legitimacy 
will fail. For example, if Sarah Palin defines to her ‘people’ as “middle America” but no such 
homogenous group exists in the United States, she cannot succeed. ‘The people’ must relate to 
each other and the leader.  
I also use the term underserved, because ‘the people’ must feel betrayed by the current 
establishment.26 Without this sentiment, ‘the people’ would not feel the need to go beyond 
political norms and elect the populist leader. Again, this group must be homogenous because of 
the way the leader addresses this people. For example, when Morales claims he represents the 
true indigenous will, not only does he wish to demonstrate that he (an indigenous leader) should 
politically represent his people, but he also wants to demonstrate that the current establishment 
does not address indigenous people’s needs. Not only is the current establishment not a part of 
the homogenous ‘people’ but also it only addresses its own elite needs. Therefore, in that sense, 
the ‘people’ feel underserved. For example, the poor majority in Venezuela feels betrayed by the 
wealthy oil elite that uses oil revenues to perpetuate its own wealth instead of providing services 
for the poor. Or the Bolivian establishment neglects its indigenous population, not recognizing 
their country’s cultural diversity.  
My theory of populism avoids confining the definition to any specific ideals, locations or 
economic climates. What populist governments share in common does not stem from these 
restrictions, but rather from the way the relationship between government/political 
elite/institutions and ‘the people’. If this relationship is imbalanced in favor of the government, 
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this creates a climate in which populism can emerge. Though a populist government will not 
necessarily emerge, these conditions allow a leader to facilitate his/her populist movement. As 
long as the leader can manipulate a large homogenous people to follow him/her – using the 
methods described above – then these conditions will allow him/her to succeed. After wooing 
his/her people, the leader then solidifies his/her relationship by instituting certain reforms that 
allow more direct participation of ‘the people’.  
With this clearer understanding of populism we now understand how populist regimes 
form and operate. Looking at some contemporary examples will help clarify what populism 
looks like in action. I will look at Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to 
demonstrate how they exemplify populism. Then, I will turn to the United States and Sarah 
Palin, to see if she falls into the populist category and what that means in an American context 
(versus a Latin American context). Though I focus on modern Latin American governments, my 
definition above extends to the American agrarian populist movements of the early 20th century, 
to more traditional Latin American populist governments – like Argentina’s Juan Perón – to 
modern Western European governments, like Italy’s Berlusconi administration. Though my 
definition is not limited to a specific time period, or region, I am choosing to look at Bolivia and 
Venezuela because they represent modern populist moments. I want to compare Sarah Palin to 
these leaders because she also might represent a modern populist figure and it is useful to 
compare her political moves to those of other modern leaders. By looking at these two leaders 
juxtaposed with Palin, we can see if Palin has any chance to succeed as a modern American 
populist leader.  
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III.  THE POPULIST LEADER 
 
After delineating a theoretical understanding of populism, analyzing contemporary 
examples demonstrates how the theoretical understanding correlates with the way populism 
operates in the real world. While populist governments consist of more than their leaders, I 
choose to focus on how the populist leader functions because populism essentially relies on the 
leader: without a leader to catalyze the movement it could not exist. The leader defines his/her 
people then uses his rhetoric and a platform that will appeal to his/her people to get elected, thus 
creating his movement. Though each populist leader uses a different message, each leader 
employs similar tactics to gain the trust and votes of his/her people. This section will outline the 
steps populist leaders take to ensure their success. After presenting a general understanding of 
the way these leaders gain power, I will show how both Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez fit into 
this framework. Having followed similar trajectories both Morales and Chávez gained the favor 
of their people to become president of their countries. While showing the ways in which their 
political/populist moves led them to the presidency, I will also analyze Sarah Palin’s current 
political position. Unlike Morales and Chávez, Palin is not yet president. Yet, not only have 
‘draft Palin for president’ web sites already formed, but also in a February 7th interview Palin 
admitted she “would be willing” to challenge current U.S. president Barack Obama for the 2012 
US Presidency.27 By closely analyzing Palin’s moves thus far, alongside her populist 
contemporaries, I can not only show how she does and does not fit within the populist 
framework but also predict if she will have the same successes as other modern populists. 
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 Populist leaders are charismatic political outsiders who successfully challenge the status 
quo (institutions, parties, economic policies) claiming to represent to true will of ‘the people’. 
Being a political outsider helps justify the populist leader’s position as one of ‘the people’. ‘The 
people’ believes the current government unsatisfactorily meets their needs and the populist 
leader has arrived to represent these unattended citizens. To do this they appeal to a 
disenfranchised ‘people’, pitting ‘the people’s will’ against the institutionalized political elite, 
creating an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. Specifically, they use rhetoric claiming that they 
represent the true will of ‘the people’, unlike the current elitist leaders and institutions. After 
using this type of populist rhetoric, to fulfill their promise to ‘the people’, populist leaders give 
‘power’ back to ‘the people’ not only via their representation, but also by instituting reforms that 
incorporate ‘the people’. For example, Chávez used referenda when trying to change the 
Venezuelan constitution, giving the people a voice.  Populist leaders claim that since they come 
from ‘the people’ and represent the interests of ‘the people’, acting as ‘the people’s’ 
representative gives political power back to ‘the people’. Additionally, once elected populists 
institute referenda, initiatives and recall giving more direct autonomy to ‘the people’. For 
example, under Evo Morales, Bolivians approved a new constitution via referendum that grants 
more power and legitimacy to the indigenous majority.28 Similarly, Hugo Chávez has used the 
referendum to change certain parts of the Venezuelan constitution, including the elimination of 
presidential term limits in a 2009 vote.  
Before granting more agency to ‘the people’ via reforms, the leader has to convince ‘the 
people’ to elect him/her. One way the leaders win over their constituency is to distance 
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themselves from the current government demonstrating that they essentially have nothing to do 
with the status quo. Since ‘the people’ is not satisfied with the existing state of affairs, this 
positioning helps the populist’s image. As a political outsider, populist leaders not only separate 
themselves from the “corrupt” establishment, but also claim to be of ‘the people’ – unlike the 
elitist rulers. For example, Evo Morales embodied this type of anti-establishment leader on many 
levels. From 1985 to 1997 the three major competing parties in Bolivian elections included: 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) and 
Moviemiento Nacional de Izquierda (MIR). In 1997 the ADN collapsed (with the death of its 
founder), leaving a fragmented party system. This led to an alliance between the MNR, MIR and 
what remained of the ADN, against burgeoning anti-systemic parties including Morales’s 
indigenous based coca workers party: Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS).29 Therefore, as MAS’s 
leader, Morales embodies an anti-establishment figure; however, Morales’s position as a political 
outsider extends beyond his party affiliation. In 2002 due to involvement in violent 
demonstrations against the government’s coca eradication policy, the Bolivian Congress voted 
for his expulsion further emphasizing his disassociation with government bureaucracy. Finally 
his Aymara roots and poor upbringing give Morales more legitimacy with his constituents and 
outsider status as an anti-elitist. Populist leaders use these elements to appeal to their constituents 
claiming that they do not operate within the corrupt political establishment and represent the true 
interests of ‘the people’.  
Looking to Venezuela, Chávez also used similar strategies to present himself as a 
political outsider. Before assuming the presidency representing his party the MVR in 1998, the 
Acción Democratica (AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente 
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(COPEI) dominated the Venezuelan political scene. In 1958 the two parties established a type of 
loyalty with one another when they signed the “Punto Fijo” pact, an agreement in which the two 
parties agreed to share partisan power and patronage, and therefore the two parties controlled 
Venezuelan politics. Over the years Venezuelan politicians instituted policies that made the 
Venezuelan economy dependent on petroleum revenues.30 However, once petroleum prices fell, 
the economy began to suffer causing a socio-cultural shift of people from rural to urban areas 
looking for work. This created a large dissatisfied mass that could act as the perfect targets of 
Chávez’s anti-establishment populist platform. Yet even before Chávez’s presidency, in 1989 the 
Venezuelan people elected Carlos Andrés Perez (AD) as president. Perez instituted neo-liberal 
reforms that privatized state companies and eliminated gas subsidies, which had long maintained 
domestic petroleum prices far beneath their international levels (and beneath the production costs 
of gasoline). Upon the elimination of the subsidy oil prices rose by as much 100%, and 
subsequently, the costs of public transportation rose by 30%.31 Since Perez’s reforms failed to 
improve Venezuela’s economy, poverty and economic depression continued and with that the 
frustration of the poor only increased. This frustration culminated with the violent “caracazo” 
riots that occurred as a reaction to a sharp increase in transportation costs.  
After these riots the Venezuelan government lost the stability it had for the last 30 years. 
In 1992 Hugo Chávez entered the political scene and the eyes of ‘the people’ after attempting a 
failed coup on the Perez administration. With this move Chávez presented himself as both 
charismatic and also a political outsider. Representing the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200) – the predecessor of the MVR – Chávez showed Venezuelans 
                                                 
30
 Bernard Mommer, “Venezuelan Oil Politics at the Crossroads,” Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, Monthly Commentary, (2001). 
31
 José Honorio Martínez, “Causas e interpretaciones del Caracazo,” HAOL, 2008.  
 25 
he came from a different political ideology/establishment than the current administration. The 
coup event caused Chávez’s imprisonment, therefore putting Chávez in a national spotlight that 
created a lasting impression of Chávez’s figure on the Venezuelan people’s mind. From this 
point on the Venezuelan people viewed Chávez as a figure that stood up to government 
corruption, unlike the established parties. 
 In 1998 the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) party ran Chávez as their candidate. 
Beyond relying on his credibility that he had gained from his coup attempt 6 years earlier, he 
used his campaign platform to further present himself as a political outsider. First and foremost 
he ran under a divergent party: the MVR. But he went beyond his party affiliation presenting 
himself not only as a political outsider, but also as anti-elite. As one of Chávez’s first campaign 
promises he vowed to begin his presidency abolishing Venezuela's old “Punto Fijo” political 
system. This promise not only further distanced Chávez from the establishment, but also 
demonstrated his anti-elite sentiments. With this reform Chávez emphasized his anti-corruption. 
Venezuelans distrusted the two established parties. By abolishing the system upon which they 
functioned, Chávez signaled his loyalty not to bureaucracy, but to his people.  He also ran on an 
anti-poverty campaign. A country with a substantial amount of oil wealth, Venezuela has a sharp 
distinction between the poor masses and the very few very wealthy ruling class. The poor 
majority distrusted the elite class blaming them for their failure to serve the needs of ‘the 
people’. Chávez promised to institute social welfare reforms. Again, Chávez presents himself as 
a political outsider because he is both not of the elite and also aligned with ‘the people’. 
Like her contemporaries, Morales and Chávez, does Sarah Palin qualify as a political 
outsider? If so, does her position align her closer to ‘the people’? Certainly her resignation as 
Alaskan governor signals a move away from the political establishment. In fact, her resignation 
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speech alludes to this shift claiming she is “not wired to operate under the same old ‘politics as 
usual’” and that she chose “the right path… even though it is unconventional and not so 
comfortable.”32 For Palin, the “same old politics as usual” indicate “what's wrong - many just 
accept that lame duck status, hit the road, draw the paycheck, and ‘milk it’.”33 In other words, 
Palin expresses her frustration with the American political establishment distancing herself from 
this bureaucracy. Though stepping down often signifies a leave of absence from politics, Palin 
admits that her “choice is to take a stand and effect change,”34 signaling that she will not remove 
herself from politics, but rather operate outside the current (and in her opinion bureaucratic) 
institutions. Simply maintaining an image as a political outsider, however, does not qualify Palin 
as a populist. Populist’s use their positioning to portray themselves as politicians more aligned 
with ‘the people’. In Morales’s case he clearly represents the underserved indigenous population 
and uses his status as a MAS leader to appeal to this constituency. By distancing herself, has 
Palin aligned herself closer to a distinct ‘people’? The New Yorker claims “she represents the 
erasure of any distinction between the governing and the governed” appealing to “whites who are 
feeling under siege by changing economic and cultural conditions.”35 Arguably, her current bus 
tour brings her closer to this constituency (she is scheduled to tour small Midwestern towns and a 
few small cities on the East Coast)36; however, the ‘people’ Palin appeals to is not easily defined 
(or as electorally significant) as Morales’s followers.  
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As Palin aligns herself with the emergent Tea Party Movement, she continues to present 
herself as a political outsider. Like other populist leaders she is positioning herself within politics 
but not via the traditional parties (in the American case: the Democrats or the Republicans). In an 
interview with Fox News Palin discusses why she feels the need to move away from the 
traditional system toward this new party  
Because both major parties, the "D" and the "R"s have both kind of lost their way 
in some respects… when the GOP strays from the planks in the platform, a 
people's movement like the Tea Party movement is invited in to kind of hold these 
politicians accountable again and remind them of their constitutional limits there 
on the federal level and it's a beautiful movement.37  
 
Here Palin, like Morales, Chávez and other populist leaders demonstrates her general distrust of 
the current ‘corrupt’ political system, which in her opinion needs to be changed. Characteristic of 
populist movements, Palin presents the solution to this political failure via a call to ‘‘the 
people’’.38 In her keynote speech at the February 2010 Tea Party convention Palin proclaimed, 
“The soul of this movement [the Tea Party Movement] is ‘the people’—everyday Americans 
who grow our food and run our small businesses, and teach our kids, and fight our wars. They’re 
folks in small towns and cities across this great nation who saw what was happening.”39 Here 
Palin presents a populist notion of ‘the people’ by defining them as “everyday Americans who 
grow our food and run our small businesses, and teach our kids, and fight our wars.” The 
difference between Palin’s conception of ‘the people’ and the other leaders I have looked at 
(Morales, Chávez, Chávez) is that hers is not as clearly delineated. Via Morales we understand 
‘the people’ as the indigenous and for Chávez ‘the poor’, but Palin just depicts the ‘average 
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American’ as ‘the people’ without much further clarification. The next section will look more 
carefully at how each of these leaders addresses his/her ‘people’ and how that fits within both a 
populist and democratic framework. 
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IV.  ANALYZING POPULISM AS A DEMOCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Undeniably, the notion of ‘the people’ is an important aspect of both populism and 
democracy. Sarah Palin, Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez all use the ideology of ‘the people’ to 
justify their political and democratic legitimacy. But beyond rhetoric of the people, what is the 
relationship populism has to democracy? After examining democracy and representation, to 
answer this question I make the following claims. Populism, as a form of representation, fits into 
a democratic framework; however, its type of representation differs from that of liberal 
democracy. Second, though populism presents an alternative to liberal democracy, it does not 
improve upon it but rather represents a perversion of democracy. Finally, I demonstrate that 
populism does in fact relate to liberal democracy pointing to Margaret Canovan’s theory, which 
suggests that populism acts as a shadow of liberal democracy.  
Populist rhetoric demonstrates that the leaders believe they act as democratic 
representatives, representing the true will of ‘the people’. Though Evo Morales said in his 
election speech “I believe only in the power of ‘the people’, he not only means ‘the people’s’ 
power to elect him as their representative but also their increased political participation. Once 
elected the leader demonstrates this belief, creating a more direct process by electing to give 
them more autonomy via measures like referendum. But even if ‘the people’ are more involved 
after his election, the populist leader ultimately represents his/her ‘people’. This type of 
representation does not discount the populist leader’s democratic legitimacy, but further 
examination reveals that the way populist leaders represent their constituency warps the 
democratic understanding of ‘representative (liberal) democracy.’ Meny and Surel point out that 
“democracy was made possible in practical terms through the unexpected combination of 
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popular sovereignty and the representative principle.”40 In democracy a tension exists between 
popular sovereignty – the will of ‘the people’ – and representation – institutions and elected 
officials. Liberal democracies rely on institutions and representation more than popular 
sovereignty. In liberal democracy, popular sovereignty manifests via elections, or public opinion, 
or theoretically the ability to run for office. Populist regimes, however, depend much more on 
popular sovereignty, not only having ‘the people’ elect their leader but also instituting reforms 
that facilitate more direct forms of democratic participation, like referendums. Reforms that 
incorporate ‘the people’s’ participatory power represents a more direct model because the people 
do not go through institutions to indicate their preferences. Therefore, theoretically, little 
difference between popular sovereignty and representation exists in populist regimes because the 
leader comes from ‘the people’, allowing them to act for themselves. In fact, populist leaders 
speak as if the ‘representative principle’ does not matter and believe democracy means the power 
of ‘the people’ and only the power of ‘the people’. Given this one-sided approach to democracy 
populism removes some aspect of representation, leaving popular sovereignty to dominate.  
Ultimately ‘the people’ elect the populist leader as their representative, meaning these 
leaders maintain some level of representation. Representation is an important aspect of 
democracy because it maintains the incorporation of individuals (the voters) but it also delegates 
power to more qualified individuals than the ‘common people’. Thinking of the populist leader 
as ‘the people’s’ representative suggests populism fits with this democratic understanding of 
populism. However, upon further analysis, the way the populist leader represents his/her people 
is distinct from our liberal democratic notion of representation. Using Benjamin Arditi’s 
understanding of different types of representation, populism falls under a category that does not 
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correlate with democratic ideology. Arditi defines representation three ways: rendering present, 
acting for others, or acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them. 
Populism presents a very ambiguous type of representation. Populist leaders maintain that they 
speak in the name of ‘the people’, use their language and give a voice to those who have no 
voice.41 Though populist leaders claim to do this, there are two issues with this mode of 
representation vis-à-vis liberal democracy. First, liberal democracy’s kind of representation tries 
to represent all people, whereas the populist understanding of ‘the people’ does not represent the 
entire electorate, but rather a specific, alienating group of people. Ultimately liberal democracy 
relies on the majority, but unlike populist modes of representation all citizens as voters are 
included in the ideology of ‘the people’: no one is in excluded by virtue of race, class, etc. On the 
other hand, populism excludes the voices of those parts of the electorate that are not part of the 
‘genuine people’. For example, when Evo Morales states that he believes in the power of ‘the 
people’ he does not mean the entire Bolivian electorate, but rather a specific subset of the 
Bolivian population: the indigenous.   
 In addition to whom these leaders represent, there is also a problem with the way 
populist leaders ‘represent’ these people. Representation means there is a gap between the actual 
people and their representatives – this is the difference between presenting oneself and having 
representation. In populism, “a similar ambiguity surrounds the gap between the absent present 
of ‘the people’ and the action of representing them. The gap is bridged by a ‘presentation’ that 
forgets the iterability at work in the ‘re-‘ of representation.”42 Populist leaders do not exhibit a 
form of representation because they remove the gap between ‘the people’ and the leader – so 
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there is no absence, but a joint presence without any representation. Additionally, the leader acts 
as the vehicle for the expression of the popular will. Rather than taking public opinion into 
account and then acting as a more educated political actor, the populist leader claims he 
expresses ‘the people’s’ will, which once again dissolves this gap between represented and 
representatives. Populist leaders act as incarnations of ‘the people’, rather than their 
representative. As the embodiment of ‘the people’, the leader has a different function than a 
representative, and therefore populism exemplifies an artificial type of representation. 
Although these populist societies maintain some semblance of representation, further 
examination reveals that they represent a perversion of democracy. Since populists rely on their 
rhetoric to define and essentially win over ‘the people’ they  “can be considered an ideological 
corruption of democracy if we consider that democracy, founded upon transmissible principles, 
implies, in Proudhon’s words, the willingness to teach and educate ‘the people’ rather than to 
seduce it.”43 This argument suggests that the way in which populist leaders approach ‘the people’ 
corrupts this democratic principle of personal enlightenment and does not present a true 
manifestation of ‘popular will’. Therefore, populist governments foster an artificial type of 
popular sovereignty. The leader “seduces” ‘the people’, convincing them they govern themselves 
(through the leader), when really this rhetoric does not maximize participation but rather 
persuades ‘the people’ to vote for a leader that makes the decisions.   
Contesting this point, Benjamin Arditi believes the populist style of persuasion does not 
differ from that of most elected leaders. These leaders rely on simple rhetoric to reduce the 
complexity of the issues presented to the electorate in order to appeal to ‘the people’ and 
ultimately get elected. Arditi argues that this “seems to be characteristic of contemporary politics 
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generally”, meaning that it does not necessarily demonstrate how populism fails to truly 
represent ‘the people’ since many elected leaders use these rhetorical tactics .44 While democratic 
leaders use rhetoric that simplifies issues, populists – unlike other democratically elected leaders 
– use very specific rhetoric of ‘the people’ to gain legitimacy and power. As discussed earlier, 
they legitimize their rule by defining their people and then claiming to represent the true will of 
‘the people’. While other democratic leaders simplify issues and use means of persuasion, 
populist leaders rely on this understanding of popular sovereignty for validation. In a sense, all 
elected leaders need to present their issues in a way that all people can understand, but not all 
leaders use the specific populist rhetoric of ‘the people’ to get elected. This differentiates 
populist leaders and other democratic leaders demonstrating that populist rhetoric corrupts the 
democratic ideal of popular sovereignty.  
Comparing populism’s specific type of representation to that of liberal democracy 
demonstrates that populism presents a distinct form of representation that is not more democratic 
than liberal democracy, and in fact is a worse type of representation. In liberal democracies the 
electorate chooses its leaders who then make decisions on behalf of their constituency. Though 
leaders hopefully represent the interests of the general will, this model has certain inherent elitist 
qualities. First, those who have enough social and economic capital to become representatives, 
and actually make decisions, come from elite backgrounds. Second, those choosing the leaders 
have varying levels of access and education, making it easier for the elite to participate and make 
educated choices. Finally, the elite runs the government and its institutions. This elite run 
government often fails to recognize the needs of its more marginalized constituents, and often 
becomes self-serving, only addressing those who have more economic and political capital. 
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Democratic leaders base their decisions on perceived public opinion, which is often defined by 
those with more money to lobby or more political capital to involve themselves in the process. 
This elitism contradicts the democratic principle that leaders should make decisions that reflect 
the general will – not the will of those with most agency and access. The populist type of 
representation, which claims to represent the true will of the people and also facilitates more 
participation of all people (not just the elite), attempts to present a more accessible government 
for all. Theoretically populism advocates for a more inclusive type of democracy, but my 
analysis has shown that this type of representation only feigns greater inclusion. This façade 
therefore makes populism a worse type of democratic representation. 
Margaret Canovan expands upon this notion of populism as a counter to liberal 
democracy’s elitism. Outlining two styles of democracy – redemptive and pragmatic – she 
claims that populism arises in the gap between the two, acting as democracy’s shadow. In other 
words, Canovan believes populism demonstrates the tension of democracy’s simultaneous 
celebration and skepticism of ‘the people’. She concludes that when the gap “between haloed 
democracy and the grubby business of politics, populists tend to move on to the vacant territory, 
promising in place of the dirty world of party maneuvering the shining ideal of democracy 
renewed.’45 For Canovan the tension of democracy produces a gap, and when the gap widens 
populism arises as a response to an asymmetry from the excess of pragmatism and a deficit of 
redemption. In other words, the government relies too heavily on institutions and not enough on 
the participation/public opinion of ‘the people’. As the institutions and the representatives – or in 
other words – the elite become too bureaucratic and self-serving, populist leaders have an 
opportunity to rally ‘the people’. They use the current situation to identify the problem with 
                                                 
45
 Margaret Canovan, “Trust ‘the people’! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,” 
Political Studies (1999): 12.  
 35 
representation and institutions. Using the ideal of popular sovereignty – or referencing the 
redemptive side of democracy – the populist leaders demonstrate that the current administration 
does not incorporate the voice of ‘the people’.  
Canovan’s theory suggests populism acts as a corrective method or at least a reaction to 
elitist democratic institutions and modes of representation. While Canovan’s terminology of ‘the 
shadow’ suggests this reaction is negative, Benjamin Arditi expands this theory calling populism 
a specter of democracy.46 Criticizing Canovan’s terminology, Arditi thinks a specter can have 
both positive and negative implications, whereas shadow implies something that necessarily 
haunts democracy.  For Arditi, populism manifests in three ways, each mode compatible with his 
terminology. First it manifests as a means of representation reconcilable with the liberal-
democratic understanding of representation. Second, it represents a mode of participation – a 
more direct democracy that relies on the direct participation of ‘the people’. Finally, it can have a 
haunting aspect – like Canovan’s shadow – in which leaders use the rhetoric of ‘the people’ and 
resort to authoritarianism. For example, Hitler’s appeal to and manipulation of the Aryan people 
justified his resort to authoritarianism; therefore putting him in this last category. Incompatible 
with democracy in any way, this facet of populism demonstrates how this seemingly democratic 
appeal to ‘the people’ can degrade into very undemocratic practices.  
According to Canovan and Arditi populism is an inherent part of democracy, acting as a 
shadow or a specter. I disagree with Arditi’s more optimistic notion that populism can manifest 
as both a positive or negative specter. Agreeing with Canovan’s shadow, my claim is that 
populism always represents a warped version of democracy, “the very ‘ideology’ of democracy, 
its normative content that contemplates ‘the power of the people’ and suggests that political 
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power must be exercised ‘for the people’ may lead, under some circumstances and through a 
distorted manipulated implementation, to populist recipes, claims, outcomes.”47 As a shadow, 
populist movements do address the shortcomings of liberal democracy: the elitism, the 
exclusionary aspects, the marginalization and its inabilities to include or represent all segments 
of society. Unfortunately, the way populism corrects for this elitism provides a less genuine type 
of representation, making this corrective method worse than liberal democracy’s elitism. Though 
populists use the rhetoric of democracy such as ‘the will of ‘the people’’ and ‘representation’ this 
does not necessarily mean populist movements represent a pure or better form of democracy, in 
fact, the ways in which populists define ‘the people’ presents an exclusionary mode of 
governance incompatible with certain liberal democratic ideals. Since populist movements 
homogenize ‘the people’, they exclude people from the process from the very beginning. Liberal 
democracies refer to ‘the people’ as electorate, giving all people fair chance to participate. 
Populist regimes demonstrate that really, these democracies do not always address all ‘the 
people’; however, by correcting for this deficiency they do not present a more democratic 
system. Instead, they only focus on the needs of the previously excluded group, thus alienating 
the rest of the population.  
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V.  POPULIST CONCEPTIONS OF ‘THE PEOPLE’ 
 
Populist leaders not only follow a similar trajectory to power, but to do this they all use 
similar rhetoric that invokes ‘the people’. Analyzing this rhetoric lends insight into the way they 
entice their electorate and ultimately gain power. Populist leaders, like many democratic leaders, 
rely on the notion of acting as a true representation of ‘the people’. However, what makes their 
rhetoric unique is though they claim to believe in the power of all people they have specific 
defined criteria for who qualifies as ‘the people’, thus alienating those who do not fall within 
these criteria. Looking at the way Morales and Chávez conceive of ‘the people’ demonstrates 
how these two leaders often reference their respective peoples and then go on to qualify them. 
Specifically Morales portrays himself as the true representative of Bolivia’s indigenous, while 
Chávez believes he acts on behalf of the poor. Like Morales and Chávez, Palin also relies on this 
notion; however, unlike Chávez and Morales her constituency is ill defined. Though she does 
reference her people as ‘Middle Americans’, this concept does not resonate or have as much 
clarity in the United States as other populist conceptions. In addition to this lack of clarity, the 
way the American electorate identifies and operates differs from that of Bolivia or Venezuela, 
making Palin’s populist rhetoric even less effective. I hypothesize that Palin’s rhetoric will not 
lead to her success because of the way the American (or liberal democratic) notion of ‘the 
people’ operates. Unfortunately, Palin is trying to enforce her populist people within a liberal 
democratic society. Populism has a distinct notion of the people that differs from a liberal 
democratic understanding. This section will define both the liberal democratic and populist 
definitions of the people, demonstrating how they operate under different terms and thus 
demonstrating why Palin’s populist politics will never lead to her electoral success. 
 38 
Before analyzing populist leaders’ usage of ‘the people’, it is useful to first understand 
common liberal democratic understandings of ‘the people’. Though democratic theorists argue 
about the ideal and actual expressions/definitions of ‘the people’, I choose to highlight two 
different conceptions of ‘the people’ that are prominent in the theorization of liberal democratic 
societies. The first understanding presents a classic, more optimistic definition of ‘the people’: 
‘the people’ act as the electorate, realizing their ‘common good’ by electing representatives who 
they believe will best represent their wants and needs. Since this definition might suggest that 
‘the people’ have more political power than they really do, I also consider this second 
conception, a more cynical or elitist model in which the elites (political leaders and 
representatives) try to win over the votes of ‘the people’, but eventually decide issues. This 
understanding gives elites more power than ‘the people’, yet still conceives of the people as 
electorate, voting on leaders. Joseph Schumpeter outlines both of these understandings in his 
famous account of contemporary democracy. Though he favors the elitist conception, he also 
discusses the more optimistic version: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making ‘the people’ itself 
decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its 
will."48 Liberal democracy incorporates ‘the people’ allowing individuals to ‘realize the common 
good’ via elections. On the other hand, Schumpeter argues for his more cynical variation 
claiming, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for ‘the people's’ vote.”49 Having little faith in ‘the people’, Schumpeter defines an elitist notion 
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of democracy, presenting ‘the people’ as commodities – just votes to be won. Rather than favor 
one over the other, I take both of these broad models as understandings of ‘the people’ in liberal 
democracy. Compared to the populist notion of ‘the people’, both the classical and more 
understandings demonstrate a very distinct notion of ‘the people’. 
While liberal democratic societies conceives of the power of ‘the people’ as an electorate 
– with equal opportunity to participate via voting – analyzing the populist leader demonstrates 
the differences between the power of the liberal democratic and populist people. In a speech 
celebrating his election, Evo Morales proclaimed, “I believe only in the power of ‘the people’… 
I have seen the importance of the power of a whole people, of a whole nation.”50 In a later speech 
he makes a similar claim suggesting “the will of ‘the people’ was imposed this September and 
October, and has begun to overcome the empire's cannons.”51 With statements like these Morales 
voices his belief, or at least what he hopes his followers will believe, that he represents the will 
of ‘the people’. When Morales references ‘the people’ he wants to generate the idea that he acts 
as an accurate representation of the general will – or, in the interest of ‘the people’ as a whole, 
which is not inconsistent with liberal democracy’s Classical Doctrine. However, he not only uses 
rhetoric such as ‘the will of ‘the people’ was imposed’ or that he believes in ‘the power of ‘the 
people’’, but he also reinforces that he specifically represents his people’s general will by 
portraying himself as one of ‘the people’. In liberal democracies, the representatives are elected 
because they can act as an accurate representative. Populism suggests that for a leader to most 
accurately represent his people he must come from the same cultural or socioeconomic 
background as his constituents. One way the populist leader convinces his people that he is one 
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of them is by using informal terms like the Spanish word for buddy or friend, “compañeros”, to 
give the impression that he is on the same level as ‘the people’.52 As discussed earlier, attempts 
like these that make the populist leader appear as a political outsider more closely aligns Morales 
with his constituency.  
In addition to using the informal language of his people, Morales further affiliates himself 
with his ‘people’ by defining the Bolivian people as the indigenous population and only the 
indigenous population. This tactic differentiates the populist understanding of the people from 
liberal democracy because ‘the people’ no longer references the entire electorate. For example 
when Morales refers to a “whole nation” he does not mean all Bolivian voters, he means the 
indigenous, the poor, the excluded, and the marginalized.53  By defining this ‘whole nation’ as 
the indigenous people Morales further legitimizes his position because he can include himself as 
a part of ‘the people’. In a speech given to the United Nations, Morales describes Bolivia’s 
situation saying, “during the republic, we [indigenous people] were discriminated, marginalized. 
They never took into account this struggle of ‘the people’s.”54 Morales, a descendent of the 
indigenous Aymara can include himself as he references the struggles of Bolivia’s indigenous. 
By using ‘we’ Morales emphasizes his cultural self-inclusion as one of ‘the people’ (specifically 
the indigenous people). This not only legitimizes his rule, but also makes his type of 
representation different than other elected rulers. Most elected rulers justify their role as ‘the 
people’s’ representative because ‘the people’ elected them as officials; however, Morales – 
though elected – further legitimates his role as their representative by saying he can truly 
represents ‘the people’ because he is a part of ‘the people’. He justifies his claim to represent the 
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voice of ‘the people’ because his voice belongs to that aggregate and therefore – he believes – 
more accurately understands and represents their wants and needs.  
 Looking at the way the term indigenous operates in Bolivian society elucidates the 
power of Morales’s rhetoric. The United Nations Group that formulated the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Indigenous People defines indigenous as:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of societies . . . 55 
 
This definition includes both direct descendents and those who choose to identify as indigenous. 
Though a subjective definition most Bolivian’s associate with a clearly marked ethnic identity. 
Within these guidelines, a majority (62%) of Bolivia’s population identifies as indigenous.56 
Morales’s ‘people’ – the indigenous population – do represent a large part of the electorate; 
however, he appeals only to the indigenous population as ‘the people’ thus alienating other 
(electoral minorities) segments of the population. This definition allows Morales to succeed as a 
political figure, but does not include the entire electorate. His definition of ‘the people’ alienates 
and dichotomizes: he represents the indigenous (specifically the coca workers), not the ‘whole 
nation’. This is inconsistent with both Morales’s language and also liberal democratic ideals that 
attempt to include all individuals. 
 Like Morales, populist leader Hugo Chávez also uses the rhetoric of  ‘the people’. During a 
televised interview on the program “Jose Vicente Hoy”, Chávez uses many of the same 
rhetorical devices as Morales. During one moment he declares:  
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The political power that we will assume within 48 hours as the new government, 
the moral power that we have been building, the intellectual power of a project for 
the future of the country, all of this we will use, and not Hugo Chávez because its 
not about one man exercising power. This power is dispersed among thousands 
and thousands of Venezuelan citizens. All of us together have to use this power to 
build a new political system.57  
 
Like Morales, Chávez uses the inclusive terms, like “we”. Again, this legitimates his presidency 
by claiming he is of ‘the people’. Second, he invokes the power of ‘the people’. Chávez claims 
‘the people’ are the ones who hold the power when he says, “this power is dispersed among 
thousands and thousands of Venezuelan citizens. All of us together have to use this power.” Like 
Morales, Chávez presents a form of representation that blurs the line between ‘the people’ and its 
representative, emphasizing the power of ‘the people’. For Chávez ‘the people’ are the important 
actors. 
 In an interview with Aleida Guevara (the daughter of South American revolutionary Che 
Guevara) Chávez outlines his definition of ‘the people’: “The concept of ‘the people’ should 
always be a concrete reality, not an abstraction. For a people to exist there should be a common 
consciousness among the inhabitants of a common territory, sharing a common history.”58 For 
Chávez, people must share a commonality. This differs from a notion of ‘the people’ as the 
electorate. Presumably the only thing the electorate shares is the power to vote for 
representatives; whereas Chávez believes ‘the people’ share more than that: they share a history. 
Chávez more clearly defines what history he believes the Venezuelan people share when asked 
about his origins “I learned what happened to the indigenous people…. I saw what had really 
happened… they slaughtered us.”59 Like Morales, Chávez aligns himself with an indigenous 
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people. Given that on his father’s side he has both African and indigenous blood, he can claim to 
be part of this sect “for me being indigenous means being part of the deepest and most authentic 
roots of our people”60 Yet, even more than relating to the “most authentic roots of our people” he 
appeals to the poor.  
Chávez’s discourse… conveyed the notion that the Venezuelen government 
was concerned with the well-being of the lower classes above that of any 
other sector. Not only did he state that poor people needed his help and 
attention more than other sectors, but he sometimes viewed class relations as 
a zero-sum game. Technocratic symbols and slogans, which appealed 
mostly to the middle classes, were absent in Chávez’s discourse.61  
 
Having come from a poor family he viewed himself as one of ‘the people’, often describing 
himself as a ’fish in water’.62  
 This populist understanding of the people differs from the people as electorate both in 
the classical sense and in the more cynical sense. The American understanding of ‘the people’ as 
electorate seeking representation does not dichotomize society in the way that Morales’s 
understanding does. Morales focuses on a relatively homogenous group (indigenous), whereas 
the United States electorate is very heterogeneous. Morales’s ‘people’ has a sense of solidarity 
because they represent a community that has a shared attribute: indigenous heritage. On the other 
hand the American electorate feels solidarity not because of a shared identity (like being 
indigenous), but rather due to the shared understanding that they elect their leaders. Therefore, 
the American and Populist understandings of ‘the people’ differ due to the ways in which each 
group finds solidarity.  
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Compared to the populist understanding of ‘the people’, ‘the people’ as electorate 
assumes one similarity between individuals: that each voter helps realize the common good via 
choosing representatives. On the other hand, populist leaders attempt to connect their people via 
a shared culture, or a shared cause. For example, the indigenous movement in Bolivia relies on a 
shared ethnic identity. Perón’s descamisados (workers) shared the same economic plight. This 
does not align with the definition above because instead of a group amassing their individual 
desires to create a ‘common will’ and hopefully realize the ‘common good’, populist peoples are 
assumed to have the same ‘common will’ – the same wants and needs. Therefore the electoral 
process does not aid in the realization of the common good because the leader presupposes the 
common good by narrowly defining a homogenized people.  
Ideally democracy reaches the ideals stated above; however, Schumpeter provides what 
he believes is a more realistic assessment of modern democracy. This provides a much less 
idealistic and more elitist understand of ‘the people’. Here Schumpeter mentions ‘the people’ 
only as votes to be won by elites. This understanding melds better with the populist 
understanding, but still has some inconsistencies. Like my understanding of populism, 
Schumpeter emphasizes the importance of the leader – those individuals that acquire power. 
Schumpeter stresses the role of the leader because he believes modern democracy has evolved 
into an elitist mode of governance. Elites, not ‘the people’, have the power and compete over 
‘the people’, like commodities. Though populism also focuses on the role of the leader to 
organize the masses, unlike Schumpeter’s definition the leader does not struggle for the votes 
like commodities. Rather, he aims his platform at those whose vote he has already won.  
Though Schumpeter and populism stress different aspects of the leader’s role, both point 
out the inherent elitism within modern democracy. The traditional definition delineates the 
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incorporation of all people to express the common will and hopefully reach the common good. 
Ideally democracy would include ‘the people’, in practice it mostly excludes them from the 
process. Examining the way modern democracy operates, Schumpeter notes that the public does 
not actually control the government, but merely elects its leaders, who hold all or most of the 
power. Though this implies that ‘the people’ have agency, really the leaders have most of the 
control, presenting their political platform competing to win votes. Populism also addresses this 
inherent elitism in liberal democracy. Populist leaders emerge in democracies because the 
leaders (or elites) fail to address the “common people”. Though Schumpeter’s preferred 
definition seems content with this outcome, populist leaders base their platform on changing this 
situation. Populism attempts to correct the elitism, appealing to ‘the people’s’ lack of 
incorporation.  
Given that Sarah Palin operates within a liberal democratic society that values the power 
of the electorate – rather than any given cultural group – her rhetoric does not generate the same 
success as her populist contemporaries. During her tour across American Palin made comments 
praising small towns as “the real America” and “pro-America areas of this great nation”. 
Attempting to separate herself from the elitist Washington politicos – as populists do – in a 
speech Palin said, “We believe that the best of America is in these small towns that we get to 
visit, and in these wonderful little pockets of what I call the real America, being here with all of 
you hard working very patriotic, um, very, um, pro-America areas of this great nation."63 When 
Palin invokes the “real America” she defines her populist people; however, within a society that 
does not conceive of ‘the people’ within terms of culture or community she faces more backlash. 
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In fact, she publicly apologized for comments like these.64 Since Palin plays the political game in 
a society that values diversity her one-dimensional populist conception of ‘the people’ will not 
lead to her electoral success. Since a majority of the American people do not relate to each other 
based on Palin’s definition of the ‘real America’ she will never have the electoral success of her 
populist contemporaries.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Looking at contemporary populist regimes both in theory and in practice 
I have demonstrated how populism emerges and operates. Focusing on Venezuela’s Hugo 
Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales I have outlined the key features of populism as a movement 
that emerges under certain political conditions. Both of these leaders operate within democratic 
societies in which the people elect the leader; however, this paper has shown that the populist 
type of democracy differs from that of liberal democracy. In fact, populism can emerge as a 
reaction to liberal democracies shortcomings, specifically the inherent elitism present within its 
institutions and processes. Unfortunately, populism’s reaction to this unjust reality creates a 
worse type of democracy. While it includes the people that the government had previously failed 
to address, it provides a false sense of agency and also alienates the rest of the electorate.  
Populism may not correct liberal democracy’s flaws; but at least it draws attention to 
its imperfections. While liberal democracy promotes equality and the incorporation of all people 
into politics, its current manifestations fail to reach this ideal. American liberal democracy 
allows the American electorate to choose its representatives; however, beyond this ability, the 
government still operates on an elitist agenda, failing to serve those with the least agency and 
capital, the most marginalized. Elites – institutions, representatives, lobbies and interest groups – 
dictate much of the American political scene. Understanding that American liberal democracy is 
far from reaching this ideal of total equality and incorporation demonstrates the appeal of a 
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figure like Sarah Palin. Like any populist leader, she has found a niche of American people that 
she feels American politics neglects. Using the same populist rhetoric and tactics as her Latin 
American contemporaries, she hopes to win over the American people. Like the Bolivian and 
Venezuelan situations, Palin believes that the government no longer addresses the needs of all 
American people, but only those of the elites and intellectuals (on the coasts). She has used her 
celebrity from the 2009 presidential election to spread this message. After quitting her job, 
publishing her book, going on a book tour and now beginning her TV career as a Fox News 
contributor (with her new show Real American Stories) and TLC reality show star, she has 
secured her place as an American public figure. And these efforts have paid off. Two million 
viewers tuned into the premier of Real American Stories and her Facebook fan page has over 1.5 
million fans65 and media can’t get enough of Palin’s politics and antics.  
Like any populist leader, Palin has used her visibility to align herself with ‘the people’. 
However, gaining celebrity does not translate into political success. Though Palin has found her 
niche, she alienates too many segments of the American electorate to ever win enough votes. 
These same tactics work in Bolivia and Venezuela because a large segment of the electorate 
relates to one another on cultural levels. Therefore, when Morales and Chávez narrowly define 
their constituencies, they only alienate a minority and can guarantee electoral success by uniting 
a majority of underserved people. In the United States, ‘the people’ do not relate along cultural 
levels, but rather as the electorate. Even though the American government may not address the 
needs of Palin’s ‘people’, and perhaps she can better represent this segment than the current 
government, referring to ‘the people’ like her populist contemporaries will not lead to her 
political success. These populist tactics and rhetoric Palin alienate too many other Americans 
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that comprise ‘the people’. While Sarah Palin may be a household name, Palin’s populism 
cannot flourish in American society. 
Though Palin’s populism won’t eradicate America’s elitist institutions, it does highlight 
liberal democracy’s failure to incorporate all people. While having elites or experts run a 
government does not necessarily present any danger to democracy’s ideals, once these 
institutions no longer govern on behalf of themselves and not the ‘the people’, then the 
government begins to lose its democratic legitimacy and something needs to change. 
Unfortunately, populism does not present the solution to this issue, but rather a reactionary 
response that ultimately provides a worse type of democracy. If anything, populism has merits 
because it demonstrates the failures of a government and does give voice to those who 
previously had none. Perhaps liberal democracies and other inherently elite governments can 
learn from populist movements and try to find a different, better solution.  
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